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We investigate under which conditions it is possible to infer the evolution of poverty at 
the  individual  level  from  the  knowledge  of  poverty  among  households.  Poverty 
measurement  is  approached  by  the  poverty  orderings  introduced  by  Foster  and 
Shorrocks (1988). The analysis is based on a reduced form of household bargaining 
(Peluso and Trannoy 2007) and provides results in terms of preservation of poverty 
orderings. We point out the main analogies and differences between inequality and 
poverty assessment, expressing them in terms of empirically testable conditions. In 
particular, knowing the change in poverty at the household level is not sufficient to 
deduce a similar change in poverty at the individual level. We need to know the change 
in the household income distributions far beyond their poverty line. The focus axiom 
does not hold in this context. 
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The concern for intra-household distribution has been advocated as an essential ingredient
for a correct measurement of inequality and poverty (Haddad and Kanbur 1990, 1994 Sen
1999 Ravallion 1996). In this paper we question the current practice of assessing poverty at
the household level. A major di¢ culty in performing poverty analysis at the individual level
arises from the assessment of intra-household inequality. Joint consumption, externalities and
lack of information about the precise assignment of goods in the household generate a "veil
of ignorance" over intra-household distribution of consumption and welfare. To overcome this
obstacle, we assume the existence of a general pattern of intra-household inequality. More
precisely, we suppose that each household is composed of two types of individuals, di⁄eren-
tiated by some characteristics such as sex or age. The actual distribution of resources within
each household is unfair between a dominant and a dominated individual. This discrimination
prevails despite the fact that the allocation of welfare within households should be egalitarian
due to equal needs among individuals. We postulate that this discrimination is homogeneously
di⁄used within the population, for instance due to a common cultural bias. Our aim is to iden-
tify the minimal information about this general "discrimination bias" to predict the evolution
of poverty among individuals, knowing only the pattern of poverty among households. We
deal with robust poverty assessments, focusing on poverty orderings introduced by Foster and
Shorrocks￿(1988) and generalized by Spencer and Fisher (1993) and Jenkins and Lambert
(1997).1
To infer poverty at the individual level from poverty measurement between households
we assume a simpli￿ed household model: intra-household allocation is described through a
sharing function, which maps household income to the income received by the dominated
type. The properties of the sharing function re￿ ect how intra-household inequality changes
with household income. We show that poverty analysis among households is informative about
1See Zheng (2000) for a survey.
2poverty among individuals if and only if the household sharing rule is concave: the poorest
households have also to be the more egalitarian. This result is in line with that in Peluso
and Trannoy (2007) on the preservation of Lorenz-type welfare and inequality orderings. This
parallelism re￿ ects the well-known link between poverty orderings and stochastic dominance
criteria.
However, when looking at the information needed to implement the result, a complication
arises from the fact that poverty measurement is based on censored data (incomes beyond the
poverty line are neglected). In a model with only private goods and equally needy individuals,
the poverty line for individuals is half the poverty line of the couple. When the sharing
function is egalitarian, there are as much poor individuals than poor households (in relative
terms). If the sharing function expresses intra-household inequality, this equivalence is lost to
the detriment of individuals. As a result, we need to get information about households which
are beyond their poverty line to document the evolution of poverty at the individual level. In
other terms, the knowledge of the change in poverty at the household level is not su¢ cient to
decide about the change in poverty at the individual level. We also need to know a little about
the evolution of inequality in income distribution among households beyond their poverty
line up to some threshold, which is all the more important that intra household allocation is
unequal. Extra information becomes necessary to empirically detect individual poverty trends
using only households￿data, and this represents a major di⁄erence with respect to inequality
measurement. The focus axiom singled out by Sen (1976) for poverty measurement does not
hold anymore in this context.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces poverty orderings and
other useful measurement tools. In Section 3 the household model is illustrated and the
main results are stated and discussed. Section 4 concludes the paper and hints for future
developments.
31.1 Basic Concepts
We consider a population composed of n homogeneous households indexed by i = 1;:::;n; with
n ￿ 2. The set of the feasible distributions of some quantitative variables (not necessarily




+ j y1 ￿ y2::: ￿ yn
￿
:
We will say that y dominates y0 according to the rank-order and we write y > y0 if yi ￿ y0
i
for i = 1;:::;n. In the following de￿nition we recall the well-know Generalized Lorenz criterion
and a further quasi-ordering, named submajorization in mathematics (see Marshall and Olkin
1979) and introduced in inequality measurement by Michelangeli et al. (2008). This criterion
expresses the idea that the distribution y dominates y0 if any partial sum of the highest
elements is lower in y than in y0.
De￿nition 1 For all y;y0 2 D











i for k = 1;::;n:







i for k = 0;::;n ￿ 1:
The two criteria are strictly related, in fact:
Remark 1
y <My0 () ￿y <GL ￿ y0:
A useful property of submajorization is stated in the following
Proposition 1 (Marshall and Olkin, 1979) For all y;y0 2 D,





i) for all f : R+ ! R non-decreasing and convex.
4The following result identi￿es the class of transformations of the variable y that guarantee
the preservation of the submajorization criterion on all the domain D.
Proposition 2 (Michelangeli et al. 2009) Let h : R+ ! R be a continuous function. The two
following conditions are equivalent:
i) h : R+ ! R is non-decreasing and convex;
ii) y <M y0 =) (h(y1);:::;h(yn)) <M (h(y0
1);:::;h(y0
n)); for all y;y0 2 D:
Michelangeli et al. (2009) provide an application of submajorization to the analysis of the
evolution of wealth inequality. Here we use submajorization to characterize standard poverty
orderings.
1.2 Poverty orderings
Let y represent an income vector belonging to D and let z be a poverty line ￿xed in absolute
terms. We designate by gi = z ￿ yi the absolute poverty gap of the household i. The resulting
vector of poverty gaps is g(z;y) = (g1;:::gn): It will be convenient to introduce the censored
vector ￿ g(z;y) = (￿ g1;:::￿ gn) , where ￿ gi = max( gi; 0):
The simplest and more di⁄used poverty measure is the headcount ratio, that is the q












Since H and Q depend on the poverty line chosen as reference, the result of the comparison
of two income distributions based on such measures may be reversed by considering di⁄erent
z￿ s. In order to secure the independence of poverty comparisons from the speci￿c value chosen
for z; Foster and Shorrocks (1988) de￿ned the poverty orderings <H and <Q as follows:
5De￿nition 2 For all y;y0 2 D;
y <H y0 () H(y;z) ￿ H(y0;z); for all z > 0
y <Q y0 () Q(y;z) ￿ Q(y0;z); for all z > 0:
Foster and Shorrocks (1988) also proved that <H is equivalent to the ￿rst order stochastic
dominance and that <Q is equivalent to the second order stochastic dominance (and therefore
to GL dominance). The following proof of the Foster and Shorrocks result about the GL
criterion illustrates the relevance of the submajorization ranking for poverty analysis.
Proposition 3 For all y;y0 2 D;
y <GL y0 () y <Q y0:
Proof. =) We know from Remark 1 above that y <GL y0 () ￿y <M ￿ y0: Then,
y <GL y0 =) ze ￿ y <Mze ￿ y0 8z ￿ 0; that is g(z;y) <Mg(z;y0); 8z ￿ 0: Since max(x;
0) is non-decreasing and convex, by Proposition 1 we deduce ￿ g(z;y) <M￿ g(z;y0); 8z ￿ 0; that
gives the result.
(= By setting z ￿ yn; from ze ￿ y <Mze ￿ y0 and Remark 1 we immediately get the
result.
Notice that <Q is a very very demanding criterion, since it requires to check <M also for
very high poverty lines. Checking the quasi-order <M on the vector ￿ g(z;y) - for a given z - we
get an intermediate criterion between <Q and the simple comparison of per capita income gap,
for a ￿xed poverty line. We de￿ne "z- poverty count" and "z- poverty gap majorization" (and
we respectively denote by <Hz and <Qz) the headcount poverty ordering and submajorization
applied on poverty gaps, for a ￿xed poverty line z.
De￿nition 3 For all y;y0 2 D;
y <Qzy0 () ￿ g(z;y) <M￿ g(z;y).
6It is easy to see that to test <Hz is equivalent to check the rank ordering between two
truncated income distributions. Similarly, by inspecting the proof of Proposition 3, it emerges
that <Qzis equivalent to check the GL dominance for the income distributions censored at
z: More precisely, if we replace y by ￿ yz; where ￿ yi = min(z;yi); we may state the following
remark.
Remark 2 For all y;y0 2 D;
￿ yz> ￿ yz0 () y <Hzy0
￿ yz<GL￿ yz0 () y <Qzy0.
If the individual poverty gaps are valued by a social decision-maker by using a non-
decreasing and convex ￿ hardship￿ function h(￿ gi); and the total ￿ social disappointment￿ is
Pn
i=1 h(￿ gi); using Proposition 1, we get a result of Spencer and Fisher (1993), also studied by
Jenkins and Lambert (1997).2
Proposition 4 For all y;y0 2 D; and for a ￿xed z > 0;
y <Qzy0 ()
Pn
i=1 h(￿ gi) ￿
Pn
i=1 h(￿ g0
i) for all h non-decreasing and convex.
In the next section, we study the preservation of poverty orderings from households￿to
individual income distributions. For these purposes, a preliminary description of household
behavior is necessary.
2 From household to individual poverty
We follow here the setup of Peluso and Trannoy (2007) considering a population of couples,
where each household is faced to a simple cake-sharing problem. Each couple is composed
of two equally needy individuals, but the intra-household allocation is unfair: A dominated
individual receives at most an income share equal to the share received by the dominant one.
2See Bishop et al. (1993) for an empirical analysis based on censored GL dominance.
7Let us denote by fi
p(yi) the amount received by the dominated individual in household i.
The amount ri received by the dominant is ri = fi
r(yi) ￿ yi ￿ fi
p(yi): Joint consumption,
externalities, altruism are neglected in this reduced model, as well as domestic production and
other components of household behavior.
Given a vector y of household incomes, p(y) =(p1;::;pj;::;pn) designates the income vector
for dominated individuals, r(y) =(r1;:::;rj;:::;rn) the income vector for dominant individuals,
and we also denote x(y) = (p(y);r(y)).
The sharing functions fi
p is assumed to be the same among households. In other terms,
a common bias induces a homogeneous intra-household discrimination within the population
considered. Let us designate by F the set of continuous sharing functions fp, with fp(0) = 0
and fp(x) ￿ 1
2x for all positive x.
The importance of the set I ￿ F of increasing sharing functions and C ￿ F of increasing
and concave sharing functions is clari￿ed in the following
Theorem 1 (Peluso and Trannoy 2007)
a) fp 2 I () [y > y0 =) x(y) > x(y0); for all y;y0 2 D]
b) fp 2 C () [y <GL y0 =) x(y) <GL x(y0); for all y;y0 2 D]:
Increasing sharing functions guarantee the preservation of the ranking order > from house-
holds to individuals. Concavity of the sharing function is identi￿ed as the key-condition on
intra-household inequality which is necessary and su¢ cient to preserve the GL dominance re-
lation from the household level to the individual one. Denoting by zc and zs the poverty line
￿xed at couple and individual level, the immediate relation zs = zc
2 comes from the fact that
the two individuals have the same needs. Some immediate consequences concerning Shorrocks
and Foster￿ s poverty orderings are summarized in the following proposition, where we are
requiring dominance for all possible poverty lines.
Proposition 5 Let fp 2 F. For all y;y0 2 D
8a) [H(y;zc) ￿ H(y0;zc) 8 zc > 0 =) H(x(y);zs) ￿ H(x(y0);zs) 8 zs > 0] i⁄ fp 2 I
b) [Q(y;zc) ￿ Q(y0;zc) 8 zc > 0 =) Q(x(y);zs) ￿ Q(x(y0);zs); 8 zs > 0] i⁄ fp 2 C
Proof. a) It is an immediate consequence of Shorrocks and Foster (1988) and of Theorem
1-a. b) is obtained combining Theorem 1-b and Proposition 3 above.
This result has an empirical relevance since it implies that to safely neglect intra-household
in poverty analysis based on the Shorrocks and Foster main poverty orderings, it is not neces-
sary to have a complete knowledge of the sharing rule. The sign of its second derivative is the
only crucial information. A concavity test then becomes the appropriate econometric tool to
be implemented.
Albeit important, the above result should be completed by analyzing conditions that secure
the preservation of the poverty orderings from the household to the individual level, for a given
poverty line. In poverty analysis, due to the presence of thresholds and censored distributions,
only limited information about the distribution of household incomes is exploited. However, in
contrast with a ￿rst intuition, instead of simplifying the framework, censoring data generates
a supplementary di¢ culty: any information about dominated individuals living in households
with incomes above the poverty line is missed. This loss of information results would be
harmless in assessing individual poverty if households are perfectly egalitarian. In other cases,
this loss of information results in us being unable to decide about the pattern of poverty among
individuals.
To explain this di¢ culty, let us consider a population of perfectly egalitarian couples.
The results conveyed by poverty orderings checked among couples for a poverty line zc, are
immediately translated into equivalent results among individuals for an individual poverty line
zs = zc=2: Does this result still hold if intra-household inequality arises from a less regular
sharing rule? Let us ￿rst consider the case in which the individual poverty line zs is set at the
level zs = fp(zc); where fp is a speci￿c sharing function belonging to the class F: Assuming
this threshold, it is easy to infer poverty relations at the individual level using data about
9couples￿income distributions.
Lemma 1 Let fp 2 F, zc > 0 and zs = fp(zc) ￿ zc
2 : Then
i) fp 2 I on the interval [0;zc] () [y <Hzc y0 ) x(y) >Hzsx(y
0) for all y;y0 2 D]:
ii) fp 2 C on the interval [0;zc] () [y <Qzcy0 ) x(y) <Qzsx(y
0) for all y;y0 2 D]:
Proof. Since fp is increasing, the incomes of the dominated individuals living in households
with y > zc are excluded from x(y) and x(y
0) censored at zs = fp(zc). We then deduce the
result from Theorem 1 and Remark 2 above:
It follows that setting the absolute poverty line at zs = zc
2 allows us to determine the
couple poverty line at which it is necessary to check poverty orderings at the couple level. By
inverting the sharing function, this threshold is simply given by z = f￿1
p (zc
2 ) and we can state
the following
Proposition 6 Let fp 2 F and zc > 0. Then,






() [y <Hz y0 for z = f￿1
p (zc
2 ) =) x(y) <Hzc
2
x(y0)
for all y;y0 2 D ]






() [y <Qz y0 for z = f￿1
p (zc
2 ) =) x(y) <Qzc
2
x(y0)
for all y;y0 2 D ].
For the preservation result to hold, a concavity test must be performed far beyond the






Figure 1 : Illustration of Proposition 6 (ii)
fp
-1(Zc/2)
On the empirical side, the proposition conveys a sort of paradox: we have to detect precise
information on intra-household inequality not only for poor households, but also for non-poor
families! The focus axiom is lost.
3 Conclusive remarks
Assuming a simpli￿ed model of household, we have shown conditions under which intra-
household inequality can be safely neglected in poverty analysis. A di⁄erence with results
previously obtained for welfare and inequality criteria of the Lorenz type has been detected.
Imagine a practitioner interested in assessing the change in poverty among individuals for a
given poverty line zs for individuals. She lacks a complete description of the intra-household
allocation of expenditures, but can easily perform poverty tests over household income dis-
tribution, eventually at the poverty line 2zs; which identi￿es poor households. Our results
indicate that to infer individual poverty from households data, she should be able to proceed
as follows. 1) Test the homogeneity of the sharing function across households; 2) Estimate the
sharing function in a range of household income which image (through the estimated sharing
11function) contains the chosen individual poverty line zs; 3) Test the concavity of such a shar-
ing function on the same range; 4) Detect a change in poverty at the household level on the
same range. The range condition is speci￿c to poverty analysis in comparison with analogous
results carried out in inequality and welfare measurement. It requires a careful investigation
since it depends on the estimated sharing function. Any error about the estimation of that
function will translate into a mistake about this range. The fourth point prescribes for testing
poverty orderings among households up to an income level higher than the poverty line set
for households, since intra-household inequality implies that poor individuals could belong also
to non-poor households. Finally, we remark that albeit the results of this paper are based for
illustrative purposes on very stringent assumptions about household behavior, it is possible to
extend them, at the price of some technical complication. An example is provided by Couprie
et al. (2007) who introduce joint consumption and household heterogeneity in the case of
welfare comparisons.
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